A few months ago I wrote an article about the Afrikaner Veto - a speculative piece about the potential role Solidariteit and its brother organisations could play in establishing a new logic of power under the new coalition government.
My prediction was tentative, and came with a major caveat - if the Movement succeed in forcing a veto on national legislation without appeal to the courts, then they will have established themselves as a de facto legislative branch, in a form similar to the old Dutch political theory of Consociationalism.
But this did not come to pass, and now we must ask why. The devil is in the details here, so I am afraid this will be a somewhat dry article at first.
The IFP have yet to be tested in a similar way on their claims to represent Zulu interests, but a similar question will be haunting the Royal House soon too. The PUTSAF movement (anti-immigrant, law-and-order nativists) have their own wilderness to wander in.
But today we are concerned with ourselves - the racial minorities (and much of the black middle classes) who consciously rely on the strength of our school governing bodies to provide a future for our children by upholding a dwindling resource of quality schools.
So far, only the Solidariteit movement has shown the means and the motivation to stand up and make a mark in this fight. But without trustworthy friends in Parliament, the Solidariteit movement and its allies may have to take more serious steps to consolidating power than they currently are. Because the revelation that the minority partners in the coalition are at the mercy of the ANC makes them no friends at all, and time is getting shorter.
The betrayal
Last week, the minority leaders of the ruling coalition betrayed their constituents by supporting the full implementation of the BELA Act, stripping school governing bodies of their powers of language policy and admissions standards, and handing these powers to the Minister, with only limited powers of appeal through the Provincial MEC.
One major threat this presents is to the Afrikaans language as a medium of public education. Another threat is to the ability for elite schools to keep the levelling affirmative action admissions policies out - most public schools force through students who have no demonstrable evidence of education, and would stretch the resources of any school even vaguely committed to achieving quality education results.
The elite schools will die, and it will take nearly a decade before people realise it, giving the establishment plenty of time to say “see, that wasn’t so bad!”.
In the coalition agreement exists a committee, called the “clearing house” mechanism, which was established to deal with differences between the parties in the coalition. It has no statutory or legal powers, but being representative of the parties involved, has the de facto power to veto legislation if it cannot reach 60% consensus (the sufficient consensus clause in the Statement of Intent).
The clearing house committee consists of: Andries Nel (ANC), Dr Corné Mulder (VF+), Brett Herron (GOOD), Helen Zille (DA) and Mdumiseni Ntuli (ANC).
Shortly before this announcement, Brett Herron wrote an article pointing out that the DA’s head of education in the Western Cape, David Maynier, had facilitated the transfer of students from a neglected black school east of Ceres to the Afrikaans-only high school in Tulbagh, which forced them to shift to a dual-medium language policy.
What Herron correctly pointed out, was that the DA had been lying to their constituents for purposes of political theatre. Of course, he fully supports the stripping of SGB authority himself, but that is by the way for a socialist like Herron:
[…]on Reconciliation Day, Maynier’s boss, DA Federal Council Chairperson Helen Zille, termed these very provisions in the Act a “revenge project against Afrikaans”.
These fundamentally contradictory positions expose Zille’s opposition to BELA for what it is: A disinformation campaign to persuade white Afrikaans speakers thinking of shifting support to the FF+ that supping at the GNU table doesn’t make the DA a lap dog.
Instead of sending her people to march in Pretoria with Afriforum, Solidarity and other Afrikaans interest organisations, Zille should invite the leaders of these organisations to Tulbagh to show them what her party is really doing - and that the sky hasn’t fallen on anyone’s head.
What Herron hides is that swallowing poison is always easier than dealing with its effects.
As experience with South African schooling demonstrates, the introduction of dual medium means there is a roughly 5-7 year period before those schools go fully English - the catchment area becomes significantly more populous the moment the language policy opens up, and soon, the administrative costs of dual medium become too high, and Afrikaans is sacrificed.
But significantly, what Herron is implying in context, is that Zille and he are on the same page regarding the policy, but that she is making the mistake of appeasing her constituents instead of educating them about the correct attitude to have.
The VF+ defence of the clearing house’s decision was the same as the DA’s, more or less - that good regulations will save us. Their short statement read as follows:
The Basic Education Laws Amendment Act (BELA) was signed this afternoon – along with an agreement that the regulations guiding the implementation of the Act will indeed resolve the contentious sections 4 and 5 dealing with language and admission.
These regulations will prescribe the norms and standards which will serve to “protect” communities’ decision-making capacity regarding their schools.
President Cyril Ramaphosa gave the assurance that the Basic Education Minister, Siviwe Gwarube, will be afforded enough time to put these regulations in place.
The FF Plus will remain actively involved, and will keep a close eye on the regulations and monitor the entire process. The party will, as part of the Government of National Unity (GNU), ensure that Afrikaans mother-tongue education is upheld.
What is notable, is that the clearing house members agreed, rather than for sending the Act back to Parliament for further amendment, for the full and immediate implementation of the Act (from the official presidential statement):
Previously, The DA said that this was a “red line” which would destroy the coalition, but it turns out the coalition partners representing minorities and Afrikaans speaking voters hold their constituency in contempt, enough to enthusiastically accelerate the implementation of the Act rather than allow any delays or amendments at all.
The DA have been fairly transparent about their intentions in the “GNU” - at least when addressing donors and their German and American handlers - they will tolerate and welcome anything the ANC wishes them to endorse, unless it destroys the constitution or the economy.
What surprised a lot of people was the endorsement of the Act by Dr Corné Mulder of the Vryheidsfront Plus. The VF+ now appears to have entirely abandoned their post. Their sole mandate in the minds of their voters (however many nuances party members may be willing to entertain) is the protection of Afrikaner interests and the pursuit of self-determination.
After 30 years of their existence, with nothing tangible to show for their permanently incumbent leadership clique's commitment to the cause of self-determination, they can no longer function as a vehicle for absorbing the radical right’s frustrations. There are exceptions, but these exceptions have not been holding the reins.
The party rank and file, whom I know well enough, have been tireless activists for clean governance, community safety, Christian values and Afrikaans culture, but are deeply frustrated with a sclerotic and bureaucratic party constitution designed to contain and expel eccentrics and potential scandals. These mechanisms have been good for some issues, but have had the broad effect of destroying dynamism and aspiration and nurturing yes-men.
The only way they could recover is with a complete renewal of leadership.
As for the DA, they are rotten from top to tail, as our several articles on the disciplinary mechanisms for local corruption have shown. Only a few earnest characters are sturdy enough to stomach the cactus they are fed as they wait for clean waters.
The minority coalition partners have now reassured us that the Act doesn’t matter, because some ephemeral policies will be put into place make sure that they will deprive parents of their rights in a responsible way. They have called this a good compromise, but I don’t think many people will see it that way.
The “compromise”
As our article on the policy framework accompanying the Act shows, the intention is to promote “indigenous language” education, which explicitly, according to framework documents, Afrikaans. This is not immediately apparent from the policy statement, but is apparent if one looks up the terms of reference in the 1997 policy document which defines the concepts they use.
These policies are already endorsed by Siviwe Gwarube who, as the above link demonstrates, was a fairly enthusiastic supporter of the Act to start with. It seems unlikely that these policies, already drawn up by the ANC in the last electoral cycle, will be rewritten (though I stand to be corrected).
The DA will also not be in charge of this department in five years. The public love the idea of unity and stability, and so the ANC’s support has risen back above 45%, according to DA-aligned polling organisations (like the esteemed and highly accurate work of Gareth van Onselen). The ANC will be in charge in 2029 one way or another, and will likely be able to jettison the DA and VF+ regardless of whether Ramaphosa’s faction is in charge or not.
As the ever-diplomatic Herman Pretorius of the SAIRR put it:
As a rule, if an act is only as good as the minister it empowers for execution, it's bad & dangerous law. And that seems to be the best spin the DAA can put on BELA Act. Should horrify the entire party. I suspect they will pay for what seems little more than prevarication.
In other words, unless we are due for some miraculous surprise, the eradication of the Afrikaans language will be complete in the public sector within 5-10 years maximum.
No opposition?
Where does this leave us? The VF+ has had its faults, though I have supported them with a caveated expectation that they would take the “red line” issues seriously, and leave the coalition in time to become the only opposition to the right of the ANC as we approach the local elections.
They had the opportunity to rock the foundations of the political system and sweep the DA from their perch as the unchallenged hegemons of minority politics. They could have delivered a referendum on Cape independence by the end of the decade, a process for the breakup of the Gauteng metropolitan municipalities, liberating Pretoria.
But they have chosen the path of least resistance, and been dragged under by a riptide. They have failed to take charge of a historic opportunity for meaningful long-term growth, and their leaders have consequently thrown their party under the bus in exchange for a retirement sinecure.
This act throws into a sharp new light Dr Corné Mulder's recent article supporting an extension of the GNU down to the municipal level of government for the 2026 local elections. This would mean reversing the recent trend of the ANC's retreat, and result in full-spectrum one-party dominance. We now have no political representation as minorities on which we can rely. We have a one-party state with minority containment branches, much like China.
The notion that the few constituencies where the DA rule will be much of a haven from central planning going forward are somewhat misplaced. The DA have been implementing BEE procurement in their municipal and provincial departments despite the 2022 court case won by Sakeliga which rendered the law which prescribed such practices unenforceable.
They have also struck agreements for deeper local-national cooperation on policing despite a mandate for greater devolution.
It seems likely that those white voters who bother turning up to the ballot box will be doing so while choking down their rising vomit, since there are no political parties of any meaningful size who oppose the ANC.
The remaining active political parties have very little talent to draw from (I say this in all kindness), and usually only have one or two people of leadership quality in their ranks, and very few administrators, donors or administrators behind them, if any.
White voters have the highest participation rate of any racial group, but that is only meaningful when they are united and can build support among other ethnicities.
Any party that wishes to rise up and replace, or even (more realistically) place adequate pressure on the DA and others to do their duty, has an enormous uphill battle against the forces of American foreign influence networks (no, Trump has not changed anything at that level), an oligarchic donor class, and the fears and inertia of 20 years of static voting patterns.
As for party vehicles, the Cape independence movement is split between two parties who have complimentary weaknesses but whose leaders cannot unite, the ACDP lack dynamism, the Minority Front has been moribund for many years, and the NCC do not feel much for issues which affect white voters. A forest of local-municipal parties have something to say against the DA, but haven’t the resources or common vision to unite.
This is not to say that these issues cannot be fixed, or that all is lost, but it is an enormous, even herculean task, and nobody is up to it on their own. The only possibility of success would come from pooling the resources of all of the above, and consolidate a political platform that aggressively pulls in the opposite direction from the ANC in every dimension.
The real opposition
Outside the Parliamentary system, minorities still have a few defenders in civic society - Sakeliga, Solidariteit, Afriforum, Kaapse Forum, and however ineffectually, the SAIRR (they remain committed to issues that are in fact in the minority’s interest, even if their strategy has been mealy-mouthed).
The Solidariteit movement, after having been invited to speak with the presidency regarding this Act, chose to launch the largest protest by the Afrikaner group in 30 years.
It was generally regarded as a PR victory, and a show of strength. Two of the DA leaders even supported the protest. But this was mostly for show - Steenhuisen is relatively isolated and little respected by his colleagues, who - it is an open secret - have been undermining him in the press. One such rival, Chris Pappas, had the arrogance to write against him in public, directly.
The Solidariteit movement, while having achieved an extraordinary number of things, enough to be the envy and curiosity of conservatives across the Western world, required allies on the inside of the parliamentary system to open the door for them, to keep up the pressure, and to deliver on their promises.
This is something well-understood by the leaders of the movement, whose appraisal of the balance of forces in the country has been, despite what their right-wing detractors have said, actually rather accurate, hence their diplomatic approach to minoritarian party politics.
They now face a retreat to the position of having to challenge the BELA Act in court. While such a challenge is not inconceivable, there are several issues with it.
First, the Constitution supplies a loophole specifically designed to allow the eradication of Afrikaans. While all pupils are entitled to be educated in their language of choice, S.29 allows the denial of this right, not only for practical purposes, but if it helps “redress”:
(2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account—
(a) equity;
(b) practicability; and
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices.
It is my understanding that, for many reasons besides this particular loophole, the “transformationists” actually have the correct interpretation of the purpose of the Constitution.
I strongly admire the leadership of Solidariteit - I am not sure I am equipped at this stage in my life to question the achievements they have made. But they have their work cut out for them now.
If you have any interest in protecting your interests, whether as a business owner, an employee or just a private individual, you would be well advised to get involved in your local chapters of Afriforum, NEASA, Solidariteit, Sakeliga, Kaapse Forum, and see to it that your interests are defended.
But the movement faces a hard crossroads. They will have to figure out how much of a stomach they have for an acceleration of tactics. And more to the point, what they would need to do to prepare their followers to go with them if they do make big moves.
We are now at a stage where we are having to rely on a judiciary which is increasingly populated by the graduates of the post-Fallist era, where nobody gets into a judge’s seat without an ideological commitment to radical transformation.
Therefore, there is very little time on the clock for us to play by the rules.
Forward?
White South Africans have displayed an extraordinary capacity to insulate themselves from the effects of social decay, through the development of private and community safety and security initiatives, both for profit and not.
This has resulted in the finding that white male homicide victimisation levels are comparable with that of northern Europe, despite the horrendous overall homicide rate. We now have private schools and universities, private fire services, and home solar panels and water tanks.
But it has also meant that normal people have a false sense of security, and thus have an inordinate amount of concern for whether they are perceived to be right-thinking on national questions and fashionable political trends.
Part of the conundrum in South Africa is that by the time the immediate balance of pressure between existential questions and social acceptability shifts, it may well be too late to act. The silver lining is that, with this betrayal in evidence, far more will be interested in seeing their non-state representatives take bold action, creating a stronger popular mandate.
There are serious options on the table for the movement, which they are well aware of, some of which I have done work for them on, which they will need to think about, no longer as faraway options, but live necessities. These are not violent, and they are not instant remedies, but they are risky.
This will, in my estimation, require strict coordination between the above-mentioned civic bodies.
It will also require a new party system, focused on disrupting the established minoritarian parties in Gauteng, KwaZulu, and the Western Cape. In the Cape, the ingredients are there to form a coalition from the white middle classes, the disenfranchised Coloured majority, and the medium-sized enterprise sector who have been so heavily shafted by DA corruption and fashionable policy. But the vehicle for this has not yet appeared.
Nor have the Zulus demonstrated the capacity to fight for their own interests in an ambitious manner - eventually their monarch will face a crossroads, and the state will go after his holdings. And if there is not enough of a radical Zulu nationalist base about then (and the MK have done much to break it up), then the IFP will likely be too risk-averse to take on the challenge. For the nation to live, the tribe must die, as the old revolutionary slogan goes.
But aside from theories and plans, moving forward will require a more substantial shift in consciousness. We need to learn to become self-critical, and serious about the strategy of self-interest.
It may sound insane to anyone reading this, but this is something the ANC are, in fact, experts at. But do not think that because they ruin everything they touch that they are entirely blinkered. They may not even care about drinking water, but they do care about the balance of forces in the state and the economy.
They have masterfully captured the liberal/minoritarian opposition, and stand a good chance of decapitating the rowdy and undisciplined radicals to their “left” (to what limited extent that term still means something in our context).
They could only have done this by accepting that they had lost the popular mandate, and understanding that they could use the DA and the VF+ to restore it - African political culture puts a premium on loyalty and cooperation for the purpose of consensus.
Working together with minorities and getting them to support Transformation - getting us to “voluntarily” give up our rights and property - is what the public want.
Now they are getting it, the ANC is gaining ground again in the polls. Their 112-year old struggle is still rolling forward.
For us to secure our ability to thrive here, we are going to have to play the same grinding game, resolute on issues that affect our collective interests, and resolute on forward progress, not rearguard action.
Solidariteit’s monumental achievements appear less secure in this frame, because while absorbing public functions into the private sphere under your control is a truly unparalleled achievement outside of collapsing Middle Eastern societies, when the private sphere is being choked out itself, it is only half of what is needed to win.
And we need to start winning. Not defending ourselves, but winning, decisively. We will know we have won when the only thing that can touch us is state military action, and when even that stands no meaningful chance of taking us down. We will have won when the decisions of the South African state are as distant and meaningless as the news from Nigeria.
The Solidariteit movement can achieve this, and likely without firing a shot. Other minorities can win by making common cause. Without a common vision, and a shedding of vanity and self-congratulation, we will die in each others embrace, amid the ashes.
But do not forget, others have overcome worse with less. As long as you draw breath, it is never over.
I will write more in a week or so, when the holidays have abated.
Merry Christmas, and a happy new year.
Several countries guilty of bribing our government during the arms deal will now oversee anti-corruption efforts under an OECD plan