In late November 2024, South Africa faced its first Phase 4 assessment under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Working Group on Bribery (WGB). The five-day review, conducted at the Financial Intelligence Centre in Centurion, aimed to evaluate South Africa’s adherence to the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
Among these countries are the governments of Germany, Italy, the UK and Sweden, who were involved in the bribery of South African official sunder President Mbeki's tenure during the arms scandal. Focus on South African corruption only largely became a feature after anti-Western president Jacob Zuma came to power, and abated after the equally corrupt, but more West-friendly Cyril Ramaphosa took power.
The Convention, a cornerstone of global anti-bribery efforts, mandates that signatories criminalize foreign bribery and adopt measures to ensure enforcement. South Africa joined the Convention in 2007, advancing through three prior assessment phases focused on legal frameworks, implementation, and enforcement mechanisms.
Of course, bribery is illegal in pretty much every jurisdiction on the planet, though in most places, mechanisms exist to permit means of bribery legally, such as the United States, where insider trading is a primary source of legal income for legislators, and private job placements for regulators of the industries for which they hope to work are considered ordinary.
The OECD itself is an organisation designed to harmonise the internal policies of the states conquered by the United States in the Second World War, and their colonial dependents. The benefits of membership are access to the American consumer market, and avoidance of punitive American economic sabotage. Downsides are the inability to determine
"Peer Review"
The WGB’s process relies on peer evaluations, with assessors from Australia and Hungary joining OECD officials to scrutinize South Africa’s progress. The exercise is more than bureaucratic formality—it exposes signatories to searching questions on compliance, enforcement, and systemic deficiencies. During the onsite visit, 17 South African panels comprising government officials, academics, journalists, and business representatives addressed topics ranging from foreign bribery investigations and mutual legal assistance to tax and accounting safeguards.
These discussions form the basis of a forthcoming report, which will outline South Africa’s achievements and shortcomings. The WGB will adopt this report in June 2025, offering recommendations for improvement. While "transparency" is a hallmark of the process, the international community has consistently presented a friendly face to the notoriously corrupt Cyril Ramaphosa, whose wealth, generated entirely from connections to the state, has received little censure.
South Africa’s journey through the WGB phases reflects an incremental policy development. The country cleared Phase 3 in December 2023, after a decade of reporting on recommendations from its 2014 evaluation. Phase 4, initiated in January 2024, places greater emphasis on enforcement, corporate accountability, and international cooperation.
Yet, the transition to Phase 4 underscores persistent challenges. Despite legislative measures, South Africa remains dogged by high-profile corruption scandals and questions about political will. The Phase 4 assessment provides an opportunity for South Africa to demonstrate its commitment to reform—but also risks exposing gaps in enforcement and oversight.
The international community wishes to see opponents to global policy harmonisation prosecuted, and in a country like South Africa, asymmetric corruption prosecution programmes are the finest implement.
What Lies Ahead
The findings, due in mid-2025, will likely shape perceptions of South Africa’s anti-corruption efforts. For a nation where bribery and graft often dominate headlines, the assessment represents both an opportunity to rebuild credibility with Western elites. As the WGB sharpens its focus on enforcement and accountability, South Africa must balance diplomatic expectations with the realities of domestic governance.
Whether the OECD's process leads to meaningful change in South Africa’s fight against foreign bribery remains an open question.
Mmusi joins a cluster of DA defectors who have embraced hardcore black nationalism. This is a dynamic well understood by DA leadership, but little addressed.