A recurring feature of the South African political landscape is our obsession with having a single movement to solve all of a community’s problems.

The ANC used to use the slogan simunye ("unity", or more literally, "we-are-one") to emphasise that there was no salvation outside the party, and that any attempt to dissent or set up shop outside The Party was "divisive".

What this mentality often leads to is frustrated incumbents trying to crush radical upstarts, or new radicals overreaching and hurting themselves by trying to take the incumbent head-on.

It is a far better strategy to let other people put chess pieces on the board for your side, and work toward a common goal (even if you can't agree on a common strategy), than to put all your efforts into turning a single pawn into a queen.

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The ANC

The ultimate demonstration of this is the Charterist movement – for years now, the ANC has been accused of failing in its mandate to fulfil the promises in the Freedom Charter. The appearance of the EFF placed enormous pressure on them to move to a more radical position regarding minority rights.

The arrival of the MK reminds voters of the make-work programs the ANC under Zuma initiated, which evaporated under Ramaphosa’s more responsible budget, and offers the only vehicle for uniting both Zulu- and black-nationalist sentiment in KZN, where the IFP was until a couple of months ago threating to replace the ANC as the governing party (in coalition with the DA).

Now that Zuma is on the scene, all three major black parties will lose votes to them, and might see MK take poll position with a quarter of the provincial vote.

The ANC could have avoided this if they didn’t prosecute Zuma and disband the MKVA, actions which triggered the largest and deadliest riot in a generation and provided the impetus for a new breakaway party.

The obsession with unity and conformity is like a dodder plant, strangling all flowers growing in the reach of its tendrils. Most people will want to see sunlight, and seek other pastures. Only an truly overwhelming power can enforce its vision, and if one does not have that kind of power, it is best to let others plant roots where you cannot grow yourself, and then work together later.

The appearance of the MK and EFF has provided an outlet for frustrated ANC voters which ironically strengthens the Charterist bloc, guaranteeing ideological dominance going into the next generation, whereas beforehand the only alternative was the DA’s watered-down liberal minority-rights program.

This is particularly visible in the black nationalist movement, where the ANC fought a decentralised war from 1979-1993 called the Peoples War, not against the apartheid state, but against any and all alternative vehicles for liberation like the BCP, AZAPO and the IFP.

This forced the IFP, which in the 1970s were the biggest anti-apartheid organisation in the country, to eventually side with the hardliners in the state security apparatus to defend themselves from ANC violence, and over the 14 years of the Peoples War operations, over 20 000 people were killed, including children, and necklacing became the standard method for solving disputes in the community, still seen today when xenophobic violence breaks out.

Aside from the damages, and simply from a balance-of-forces perspective, this approach would have been impossible had the ANC not been the recipient of millions of dollars in aid, training and intelligence from the Soviet Union, and without the West's backing later on, the NP would have had a free hand to crush them.

What they learned by the early to mid 1980s was that they needed an allied organisation to fight above ground in the civic sector. Arguably the most effective part of the ANC’s strategy within South Africa was the UDF, which created a legal vehicle for minorities to participate in without risking arrest for treason or membership of a banned organisation, while still functionally working with the ANC.

Likewise, the splintering of the ANC, just as the party is losing its majority, offers voters other ways to push for the same model the ANC offers, without feeling like they are. The Charterist bloc will retain its >60% voting lead, even as the ANC's share shrinks.

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Cape independence

In the Cape independence movement, many people, both insiders and observers, have noted with some consternation that the movement in splintered – it is shared between Jack Miller’s Cape Independence Party (CIP), Des Palm’s CapeXit (CX), the Vryheidsfront Plus (VF+), the CIAG and the Referendum Party (RP).

Miller’s CIP aside, all other members of the movement are making significant contributions to the movement. Miller carried the can for many years while the movement languished in obscurity, but ultimately it was a diversification of approaches which elevated the secessionist option to a greater standing in politics.

What has hampered the movement (just a little), is an insistence on territorial pissing contests over branding between the CIP and CX, over the use of the term “CapeXit” for campaigning purposes.

The CIAG and CX achieved far more than the CIP ever did, largely because they went for completely different approaches. CX collected 800 000 pledges from people in the Western Cape supporting the idea of secession, which grew awareness to a very large extent, but was limited by their inability to organise on the streets or in the institutions.

The CIAG, by focusing on lobbying, demonstrations, and public relations, made people far more aware of the legal processes, drew people into physical involvement in activities, and provided greater legal coverage, even putting enough pressure on the DA that they finally had to create (admittedly rather toothless) legislation for devolution to try to contain secessionist sentiment.

In the Cape, the DA simply cannot be replaced in the next electoral cycle – people are too afraid of the ANC getting g in with some kind of coalition, so they are unlikely to give their votes to a new party without some reassurances. so the CIAG focused on combining cooperation with tangible threats, escalating both engagement and competition at the same time.

Now they have a two-party front that can target both Afrikaners and conservative (FV+) and Anglos, Coloured moderates and liberals (RP). This can achieve enough momentum to force the DA to form a coalition with them, especially as Coloured nationalists eat away at their base from the other side. This gives them the power to leverage a referendum, which at this stage would be a shoo-in for secession if it were held today.

Coloured nationalism seems like a scattershot movement, but it is fact simply reflecting the natural fracture lines of the Cape coloured population – Al-Jamaa for the Muslims, Cape Coloured Congress for the poor inner-city, Patriotic Alliance for the gang-affiliated and rural populations, GOOD for disaffected former ANC supporters, and Marius Fransman’s weird new outfit for, well, who knows.

But the point here is that with the tensions created by personalities within the Coloured population, who are slow to trust and quick to anger, given the great length of time in which they have been ruled by and betrayed by other racial groups, is easily assuaged by simply having a large selection of people to vote for, who can cooperate at a later stage without fear of being captured.

For years, the DA fought viciously against competition on the right and the centre from smaller parties, and only very recently realised that it was best to accept the dominant position in a broader coalition. While they may still be planning a betrayal, and hoping to cross over to an ANC coalition, it is clear that encouraging the growth of alternative Liberal parties is far better than getting sucked into internecine conflict with people one will have to share coalitions with anyway.

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Afrikaner nationalism

Similarly, in the Afrikaner nationalist sphere, the tension between the Bittereinders (BE) and the other representatives has come to a head recently, as the BE reproaches the various elements of the Solidariteit movement (including AfriForum) and the VF+ for their slow pace of power acquisition.

However, these organisations grow really rather slowly, and take many years to reach the critical mass they have now, where they are finally within spitting distance of tangible victories.

The Bittereinders on the other hand, have opted for a quasi-militaristic approach – this has its benefits and its uses, but relies on restraint and a clear mandate which differs significantly from the broader activities of the Solidariteit movement.

With rather limited capacity to act in radical ways in the present, the BE are a rather frustrated crew. AfriForum has better relations with the police, and have a far better legal team and public relations. Their research branch adds heft to public communication and allows them to present themselves as a serious and civilised organisation.

The quasi-military approach has its value in providing people the sense that if things get truly out of hand, there is someone who has their backs, and can defend actual territory, with force.

But the use cases for this particular activity is very limited, and relies on extraordinary discipline and restraint, both at the strategic and the tactical level, especially considering the enormously asymmetrical balance of forces in this country.

The Bittereinders have shown good discipline by international standards, but in the context of the South African situation, have recently shown increased impatience with the slow pace of change.

Unfortunately for the BE, only Solidariteit (the umbrella organisation, not the trade union) is so vast in its size and scope that there is no other organisation capable of doing what they do. Plans for achieving autonomy in any part of South Africa will rely on their cooperation – in fact it relies on their initiation of these projects – and so attacking them head on will likely lead to frustration and mistakes.

Solidariteit, for their part, started as a trade union, and instead of trying to push out all other trade unions (with which they could not possibly compete without destroying their mission), they spun off several other organisations, and brought still other newcomers into the fold, with little oversight or direct control, instead building a loose alliance, growing unity through cooperation.

They are now positioned to take on the state through the distribution of capital, talent, organisation of property, and legal strategy at a national scale, with the potential to form a complete parallel state within five years if their current Federal Plan (to be published in October) comes to the right strategy.

Bittereinders do not have this power, and would be advised to find a strategy that does not require them punching far above their weight class, as they are more likely to get burned by the state before they achieve critical mass.

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Wrestling with friends

As someone who has a foot in several camps in minority politics, it seems to me that the best route to follow is comparative advantage. If there is a gap not being filled, it should be filled without worrying about taking over the purview of others in ones camp.

The exception to this is if there is a chess piece on the board which is doing nothing and needs to move, and for which there is no time to find a replacement. In those cases, the best thing to do is to force them to move, rather than to try to take them head-on.

The best option for those who wish to see faster change is to keep communication with lead decisionmakers, and apply what leverage one can to move policies in the right direction – you cannot compete with an ox in a wagon-pulling competition, but you can hurry it on if you use the whip correctly. You also need very clear ideas of where you want to go, not just in principle, but in practical steps.

At the risk of overstretching this metaphor, simply whipping the ox will not achieve cooperation, but likely make them buck the cart – whips are best used as a means to startle the animal with a sudden loud noise, and a gentle prod on the buttocks.

After all, diversity of institutions is what made the West so dynamic in the first place - the mutual competition of the market, the Church, the state, the press; fractured departments separating governmental powers - this tension and competition, and the constant warring states of Europe all propelled the civilisation to heights unseen by any other in history.

And finally and most importantly (though it may go without saying) minorities simply cannot compete with the majority in power politics. We must pursue victories in areas where we have a comparative advantage, and get cooperation from black communities where we can. There is no need to fight over everything, only a clear understanding of our goals, and an ability to remain agile and focused.

May a thousand flowers bloom.

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