Hugo Kruger shows how the state-owned enterprise was already aware of the risks, and asks why they did nothing to prevent the accident from occurring
This week there was a fire event at Unit 6 of Kriel Power Station, with Eskom’s official press statement saying:
“A preliminary investigation revealed that an oil pipe had broken, causing an oil spill on the hot surfaces of the turbine, which triggered a fire.”
But what Eskom, through its Censorship by Omission, does not appear to tell the public is that this risk was already identified in the VGBE Energy Report. They have known about the risk since last year.
Readers of my Substack may recall that between February and August of 2023, the South African Treasury contracted independent teams, led by the German company VGBE Energy, to assess the status of the coal fleet. Initially, the Treasury attempted to withhold this information from the public. However, after significant public pressure, especially following testimonies at the commission of inquiry into the unbundling of Eskom, the government ultimately agreed to release the report just before the election.
The VGBE Energy report significantly shifted the narrative on coal generation, concluding that the coal fleet’s failures were not primarily due to its age—a rationale that some lobbyists and pundits had promoted. Instead, the report attributed the issues to Eskom’s inefficient management system that was too centralized and notably made maintenance almost impossible. As noted on page 60 of the report:
“The main root cause for the low EAF is the dysfunctional management system of Eskom. It is characterised by inefficient processes – especially in procurement –, a lack of authority and an opaque decision-making structure. The plant management, with its limited authority and high level of interference from the headquarters is unable to focus its attention on its primary responsibility: reliable plant O&M. Currently, even a mediocre level of performance (e.g. EAF) is accepted as sufficient.”
The report went further and wrote a sub-section as to what is wrong at each power station. Notably, it highlights serious issues at Kriel Power Station in the section on page 220
“Moreover, the fire protection equipment was identified as a safety risk. The inspection deadlines for some of the extinguishers had been exceeded and others were simply lying on the grating “
On page 221, additional risks are documented:
These risks are critical to the site, particularly due to potential fire hazards. Fire risks in any power plant cannot be entirely eliminated; they are managed through engineering design, safety margins, and by separating the three elements of the fire triangle: heat, fuel, and oxygen. If even one of these elements is removed, the risk of fire is controlled. However, as the VGBE Energy report highlights, the potential for fire hazards has consistently existed at Kriel Power Station. It was just waiting to occur.
The question now arises, that given that Eskom had access to this information, why did it fail to act to mitigate these risks? Additionally, has Eskom addressed the other risks identified in the VGBE report? Worker health, public safety, and the threat of returning loadshedding remain pressing concerns.
Although last year’s exit from loadshedding suggests some improvement in power generation, it seems that Eskom’s management has yet to learn that it is far more effective to mitigate or eliminate risks proactively, before they escalate.
If they know about the risks, why didn’t they act? The public and Eskom’s workers deserve answers and not simplistic press statements from Eskom.
