The South African government welcomed the COP29 agreement securing $300 billion annually by 2035 from high-income countries for climate action in developing economies. But according to Minister Dion George, this commitment needs to rise to at least $1.3 trillion per year.

It remains to be seen how the $300 billion loan will be spent, or to which “developing countries” it will go to, but if the previous R8.5 billion grant for the “Just Transition” is any indicator, the money will be laundered straight back into Western companies, banks, and parasitic NGOs while the South African taxpayer funds the cost and the interest (see this Wits University study for reference).

Deputy Director-General Maesela Kekana highlighted the need for financial reforms to address barriers like high debt and “limited fiscal space”. But Minister Dion George called the outcomes a "win for the country," noting advancements in carbon market projects (under Paris Agreement articles 6.2 and 6.4) and the Mitigation Work Programme, co-chaired by South Africa.

The conference also progressed on adaptation goals, with a Loss and Damage Fund set to support vulnerable communities by mid-2025. George emphasized the significance ahead of South Africa's upcoming G20 presidency.

This sales pitch aside, the deal entails a massive economic shift, and Minister George is fully furnished with extraordinary powers to control almost the entire economy. The Climate Change Act passed earlier this year gives him plenary powers to control the business model of any sector, subdivision, or even individual enterprise anywhere in the economy, making him by far the most powerful minister in the government.

It is no surprise then, that issues of environmental protection, racial discrimination, and the management of forestries and fisheries have taken a backseat under his tenure.

However, these new powers of his will be wielded not as a politician, but as the civil servant of a foreign political entity, namely the United Nations, whose economic and social central planning doctrine has been the core manifesto of the DA for several years.

Key agreements include a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, an Adaptation Goal, and progress on carbon markets under the Paris Agreement (articles 6.2 and 6.4).

What these two articles specifically mean, is that the organisation established by the Paris Climate Agreement will centrally control our economy and direct all practices within it using various degrowth-oriented material targets.

Article 6.2 stipulates that the accounting practices for measuring the carbon emissions of various sectors and economic practices will be centrally created and subject to supervision by the international committee.

Article 6.4 establishes that the committee is committed to reducing carbon emissions, but also that one country’s reductions can be used to fund the expansion of emissions in other countries.

This means that the central committee will be able to directly decide whether or not a given country is allowed to grow its economy or not.

With a precarious political system whose survival depends on rapid economic growth, this places us in a tricky situation. Already, on the 13th of November, South Africa’s National Treasury released a discussion paper outlining Phase Two of the country’s carbon tax regime.  

Stakeholders are invited to submit their comments by December 13th, since a public commentary period is legally mandatory, butno substantive critical recommendation will be entertained, since the methodology and quantification of the carbon taxes are already mandated by the committee of the Paris Climate Agreement.

Introduced in 2019, the Carbon Tax Act forms a core part of South Africa’s climate mitigation strategy under the Paris Agreement. The first phase imposed a marginal tax rate of R120 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, with allowances reducing effective rates by 60–95%. This approach cushioned industries, giving them time to adopt cleaner technologies.

Agriculture, forestry, and land use sectors (AFOLU) have enjoyed a full exemption due to "the absence of appropriate methodologies for GHG emissions determination and subsequent administrative difficulties in measuring and verifying emissions hence application of the carbon tax to AFOLU activities. Only fuel related combustion emissions from the sector’s activities were included in the carbon tax net".

Fuel taxes will continue to rise, as will taxes on all economic activity. Initially, Phase Two was slated for 2023 but has been postponed to 2026. Under the new plan, carbon tax rates will increase progressively until 2035, reaching R462 per tonne, while allowances will gradually decrease to 72.5%.

Rising fuel and energy prices, are already affecting operations and could intensify. Agricultural enterprises should preemptively mitigate these impacts, as the sector’s exemption may not extend beyond 2035.

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