Leo Barnes | M.K.P. spells "doom"

The uMkhonto we Sizwe Party heralds the acceleration of the black nationalist movement's radical economic transformation program, and with it, the death knell of Liberalism

Leo Barnes

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Leo Barnes

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Apr 4, 2024

Leo Barnes | M.K.P. spells "doom"

Something is brewing in South Africa's powder keg, KZN. It's an image the continent is all too familiar with: a former president rallies his support through a militant political movement, seeking to depose the ruling party.

We’ve been told that outside of the Western Cape, there is a silent majority of liberal South Africans that disparage the EFF, and quietly wish for the ANC to be removed. These mass tides of would-be DA votes have never materialised, and in all likelihood, never will.

Containment failure

Zuma’s new uMkhonto we Sizwe Party (MK for short) has spent its debut political campaign dressing up in military regalia, hosting mass rallies, and promising that if the results of the election are not to their liking, then they will plunge the country into civil war.

Instead, it appears that MK may have more of a say over the ANC’s decline than one might initially assume for a party formed so last minute before the election. The MK party, if recent polling from the Brenthurst Foundation is accurate, is on course to potentially win more black votes on the national stage than the DA has achieved in recent elections.

A party founded on the promise of bringing back Jacob Zuma and ushering in a new era of radical economic transformation is more appealing to most South Africans than the liberalism of the Democratic Alliance. This might be surprising to those indoctrinated by the idea that a declining ANC invariably means a rising DA or, at the very least, a rise of liberal parties that aim to fix the disastrous tenure of the current regime.

However, the MK party is not an arbitrary, purely ego-driven creation of Zuma. Instead, it is the recognition of the limitations that the Radical Economic Transformation (RET) faction of the ANC has suffered from in recent years.

The RET cohort in South African politics has suffered on two critical fronts since 1994. Firstly, a lack of a political home outside of the ANC. The ANC, for decades, has been a broad church that has done well to keep the RET faction locked away in its basement, depriving it of a suitable political home.

The degree to which concessions made to the RET faction may appear substantial at a cursory glance. BBBEE, in particular, has been a major boon for those seeking to revolutionise the South African economy.

However, the full extent to which the country would be reshaped should the radical factions' dreams be realised cannot be understated. Expropriation without compensation is perhaps the first grand change while likely being the one South Africans are most familiar with.

The policy seeks to completely circumvent or even eliminate property rights for the country’s land-owners. The result of such a move would be catastrophic for various different reasons and the reality of its outcome is not lost on the ruling party. As such, the ANC has sought to keep the RET factions in its ranks onside by giving lip service to the issue and implementing other programs of land acquisition, whilst not attempting to implement the policy itself.

Essentially, they are stringing along the radicals in its camp without any intention of giving in to their demands, at least for now.

Solve et Coagula

Until recent years, this measure of tip-toeing around the issue, along with several other RET priorities, has been effective in keeping the divisions within the ANC internal and out of the public eye. However, as we saw just over ten years ago with the break-away of the EFF, this practice can not keep everyone happy forever. The result is perhaps the second largest break-up in the ANC’s post-1994 history: the creation of the MK party.

Secondly, the current externalisation of the ANC’s RET faction, the EFF, effectively has insurmountable political market constraints. It is too socially left-wing.

The EFF will never garner a truly unstoppable force in South Africa due to two foundational aspects of the party. The first problem for Malema’s party is that pan-Africanism in one of the most xenophobic countries in the world is not a winning issue.

Most South Africans blame immigrants for a huge array of the country's ills. Everything from crime to food prices gets blamed on immigrants from other African countries, particularly Zimbabwe. Notably, a country that Malema is quite open in his fondness of.

Secondly, the majority of South Africans are deeply religious Christians and traditionalists. They hold their traditional and Christian values dearly. Malema, in contrast to this, is relentless with his promotion of LGBT issues, and advocating against Christianity, even going so far as claiming that “We don’t need a silly cross to save our people.” This does not leave a great impression on the Christian masses of South Africa and proves to be a major hindrance to the RET mission.

What the RET faction has needed for years has been a right-wing refuge: A new home for traditionalists, religious folk, and other socially right-wing individuals to band together and fight for Radical Economic Transformation. This is where MK steps in.

The EFF, currently sitting on just over 10% of parliament, could never hope to command a plurality in the National Assembly, not anytime soon in any case. The party's current polling figures vary greatly, with them standing at anywhere from 7% to 18% nationally. However, most polling places them around the 11-12% mark and the same poll putting MK at 13% nationally, puts the EFF at 10%. MK, however, provides a great opportunity for the RET faction. As it stands, the MK party and EFF are polling together at ~23% in the most recent polling by the Brenthurst Foundation. If the elections were to pan out this way, then the RET faction would boast growth from 6% in 2014 to 23% in 2024, nearly quadrupling their electoral support in just a decade. Such growth naturally leaves us with a dire outlook for the future of the South African political landscape.

This alliance between RET parties across the aisle is not a hypothetical one. MK, and its de facto leader, Zuma, have been doing the legwork to swoon the EFF and make it clear that MK is not here to take over from the EFF but rather to work with it and win the votes that the EFF never could. It was made abundantly clear that this was the case in a happy birthday video that Zuma made public for Julius Malema's 43rd birthday. In the video, Zuma called for unity and that “we”, referring to both leaders’ respective parties, must obtain a two-thirds majority in the upcoming general election.

Beyond the black rainbow

Quite simply, the majority of South Africans are not interested in what the DA is selling. They have failed to win over the ANC vote, and now voters appear to be heading in the opposite direction, further away from the country's second-largest party.

This should raise alarm bells to those in the liberal parties of SA that have continually assured us that as the decline of the ANC’s role as the hegemon of South African politics continues, the result will be a new wave of liberal democracy. They promised a new era of fixing the neglect and destruction that the ANC has inflicted upon the country. This does not appear to be materialising.

As recent reports and polling come in ahead of the 2024 general election, the reality of the situation is dawning upon the nation. It is becoming increasingly probable that the ANC will not be usurped by liberalism, but instead, a vile mix of socialism, black nationalism, and authoritarianism. This particular mix of ideologies will come as no surprise to those with their finger on the pulse of South Africa's democratic backsliding:

“Six in 10 South Africans (62%) were willing to give up elections for a non-elected government that can provide jobs, housing, and security. Young people (67% of those aged 18-35 years) were the most willing to forego elections,” reports Afrobarometer in July 2020.

To put it simply, South Africans are looking for alternatives to democracy, which they are increasingly seeing as potentially not part of the solution to fixing the problems and crises the country is facing. This news will be exceptionally frustrating to those who can see the democratic route out of this mess.

It is imperative to remember that the roots of democracy are very shallow in the minds of most South Africans. Voting was, after all, a right that was held exclusively by the white minority until thirty years ago. Democracy is perhaps not as strong a facet of the national identity as we have assumed up to this stage.

The sun sets in the West

Why are we not seeing a similar shift towards authoritarianism and RET ideologies in the Western Cape? The truth is, we are, albeit to a far smaller degree. So a better question to ask is perhaps: why is the Western Cape seemingly more resilient to the illiberalism that is quickly rising to prominence in the rest of South Africa? The answer to this is complex but fundamentally lies in the uncomfortable fact that rarely gets acknowledged on the national stage: the Western Cape is simply nothing like the other 9 provinces. The Western Cape has a long and rich history of liberalism that stretches long before 1994.

We can see this fundamental difference in the voting patterns of the province. At no point has the Western Cape ever voted for the current ruling party of South Africa. The province has instead continually supported liberal opposition parties such as the New National Party and now the DA.

The Western Cape, through various opposition parties but in particular the DA, has attempted to convince the rest of the country that nonracialism, free markets and greater personal liberty is the way forward. The country, in turn, has continually rejected the calls of the Western Cape and has instead decided to march in the opposite direction.

This, naturally, has created a great deal of friction between South Africa and the Western Cape. This friction has perhaps become most notable in the continual calls for greater degrees of autonomy for the province. These calls will not die down. Instead, it is far more probable that as South Africa grows more illiberal, as freedoms and markets are cracked down on, the Western Cape will grow in its dissociation from the rest of the country. The growing calls for self-determination or even Cape independence should be no surprise to those who recognise the disconnect between the province and the national institutions that have continuously dragged it down.

The reality of the situation does not appear to have made it up the hierarchy of the Western Cape's preeminent political institution, the Democratic Alliance. It is important to note that the DA is not the Western Cape Party. They have duties and loyalties that lie outside the province.

This reality is not a good thing for the Western Cape. In a country that is increasingly abandoning its principles and walking down a dark path, the only vestige of Western liberalism must be defended with laser focus. The DA must become the Western Cape party or replaced with someone who will be. If the time ever arrives that the Western Cape must take decisive action concerning its future, the people making that decision cannot have a conflict of interest. They must be 100% committed to this province and its people. Any potential divorce must be a clean one.

As South Africa grapples with increasing disillusionment with democracy and growing support for alternative ideologies, the future of the country's political landscape remains uncertain. The DA's failure to fully embrace its role as a champion of Western Cape’s liberal values raises questions about its ability to navigate this tumultuous time in our history.

Ultimately, the trajectory of the Western Cape's future hinges on its ability to address deep-rooted grievances with the national body and withstand the changing tides of radical politics.

Even if this, in turn, requires radical action.

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